Geo100 Brisbane Floods

ESSAY As immanent disasters are inevitable, it is essential that we as humans mitigate the potential outcomes caused by these disasters. This essay will explore the 2011 torrents of Brisbane and whether proper formulation and preparation could postulate minimised the outcome. It will further explore the impact the Wivenhoe close up had on the floods and controert whether butch maintenance level supplies and warnings could redeem boostered. December 2010 and January 2011 saw Queensland finger record-breaking fallfall that has non been seen since 1960.Approximately 1 000 millimetres of rainfall was recorded in January alone, which caused the insurgent biggest flood Brisbane has experienced since 1974 (Hornet & McAneney, 20111150). The 2011 floods caused severe forlornness throughout Brisbane with over 26 000 people loosing their homes and over 5 000 businesses around the city all partially or completely flooded. It further caused around ninety kindergartens and deuce-ac escore schools to be affected and unusable. However the greatest devastation was the loss of 23 peoples lives as a direct result of the floods (Calligeros, 20114).The Queensland disposal also suffered a major financial repercussion from the floods. Over 440 one thousand thousand dollars was spent in repairing roads, bridges, power poles and other public facilities that were destroyed (PM With note Colvin 2011). This kind of spending by the Government caused speculation that if proper cooking and preparation been implemented, the Brisbane floods could pass on been excuse. This speculation further lead to the investigating of whether the Wivenhoe Dam helped or hindered the floods.The Wivenhoe Dam opened in 1985 after the great Brisbane floods of 1974 occurred and was seen as a solution to pr flusht further floods from happening again. All the dams, creeks and rivers border the Wivenhoe Dam were connected that any potential overflow could run refined into the Wivenhoe and thit herfore see minimal risk of over menstruum. However what occurred in 2011 was not what was planned when building Wivenhoe some(prenominal) years earlier. Wivenhoe Dam was built to last a water supply of 1. 5 million millilitres of water, with a expertness to hold 1. 45 million millilitres at Full Supply level or FSL. The 30 million-millilitre difference was allocated as a reserve for floodwaters to help mitigate flooding (Honert & McAneney, 20111152). Although a reserve level had been allocated in the dam, the give up was that there had been constant and heavy rainfall in the previous effluence months. This led to the Wivenhoe catchments be relatively full prior to the downpour that occurred in the December 2010 and January 2011.This rain further caused the surrounding rivers and creeks to overflow causing secondary river flooding, with water then starting to flow into Wivenhoe to help pr fount major flooding. Leading up to the floods Wivenhoe peaked at 1. 50pm on Wednesday 12th of January grasp an astounding 2. 29 million millilitres. ( imbibe Appendix 1 Table 1. 0). A day later Brisbane River peaked at 4. 46 metres at 2. 57am on atomic number 90 13th of January, causing major flooding to begin. (See Appendix 2 Graph 2. 0).It was during these two days that the role the SEQWater played was questioned, as they were aware that the dams were high enough to overflow. This speculation was further fuelled when it was made known that SEQWater notwithstanding released 60% of the dams water, moments before the flood engulfed Brisbane (See Appendix 3 Table 3. 0). SEQWater is the lodge in charge of the Wivenhoe and flip Dams and turn out three simple operating guidelines that they must(prenominal) follow (See Appendix 4 Guidelines 4. 0).It was unmixed that none of the guidelines were followed for a number of reasons. Firstly this was evident as when the Wivenhoe and Somerset dams began filling up as a result of the severe strong weather, SEQWater di d not release any water from either dam until Tuesday eleventh of January. As they had left the water idling for too long they had no other choice but to release the water at at one time instead of gradually cathartic water like they were advised to do from the Senior Flood Operations Engineer.After the flood occurred SEQWater stated back, The flood compartments of the dams were modify to a high level by the first flood that there was not sufficient time to release this water prior to the second flood arriving, (Water, 20111158). So although the SEQWater tried to justify their actions, it can be argued that the SEQWater company and the employees were warned a few days in advance that by releasing a small amount of water at different quantify during the day would help minimise the amount of flooding that could have potentially occurred.Once it was discovered that the SEQWater had received numerous warning of potential warnings, the issue was canvass and analysed. It was estimate d that between 1100 Tuesday 11th of January and 1909 Wednesday 12th of January that 518,000 millilitres of water was released from Wivenhoe dam making around a 60% contribution to the already uphill water around the Brisbane area. (See Appendix 3 Table 3. 0). By 609pm Thursday the 13th of January the water flowing past the City approximate was estimated to be around 866,000 millilitres and was still continuing to rise. See Appendix 5 Table 5. 0). The final detailed analysis sent out to SEQWater by the Senior Floods Operation Engineer it was analysed that if releases from the Wivenhoe dam were timed appropriately it could have minimised the flooding that occurred. (See Appendix 6 Analysis 6. 0). The Bureau of Meteorology turn up to be helpful through the disaster, by providing warnings through their rainfall data. periodic rainfall charts and rainfall maps were updated online and made easily accessible to the public and those affected. See Appendix 7 and 8 Graph and Chart 7. 0). The BOM also released a clear warning to both the government and the public that the amount of rain that was coming would have the likely strength of a La Nina event. As the information was made available to anyone with Internet access, SEQWater and the Government could have easily accessed this information. By doing so they would have been able to see the potential menace the approaching heavy rainfall could have and in turn should have helped them make a wiser decision.By choosing to ignore any sort of warning score provided by the BOM, SEQWater and their employees did nothing about the almost full catchment even though more heavy rain was approaching. Leading to the conclusion that by ignoring the warnings they demonstrated poor planning and ignorance to the information provided. Throughout this essay is has been cogitate that through proper planning and preparation the Brisbane Floods of 2011 could have been mitigated. Evidence and investigate shown throughout this essa y evidently points unfavourably to the SEQWater company and its team.It concluded that although many warnings were issued, the SEQWater and government chose to ignore them and therefore resulting in all the water being released at once. Even though this natural disaster could not have been prevented through proper planning and preparation it definitely could have been mitigated which would in turn also result in minimal devastation and destruction. This flood has also been dubbed a dam release flood by hydrologists that were appointed with the Insurance Council of Australia.Again as the evidence and research implies, with proper planning and preparation yes, the Brisbane flood of 2011 could have been mitigated. attachment 1 TABLE 1. 0 WIVENHOE concomitant 2 GRAPH 1. 0 CITY pretend addition 3 TABLE 1. 1 RELAEASE FROM WIVENHOE PLUS CITY GAUGE APPENDIX 4 GUIDELINES 3. 0 OPERATING GUIDELINES * The flood reposition (or catchments) should generally be kept empty by releasing all the water flowing into the flood storage system until the delimitate downstream flood event is reached. Releases from the storage system should then be selected to remain below the defined downstream flood event until the flood event has passed or the storage system becomes full. * If the flood storage system becomes full, the storage system must then release all the inflows but releases should never exceed inflows. APPENDIX 5 TABLE 1. 2 ESTIMATED FLOW PAST CITY GAUGE APPENDIX 6 ANALYSIS 6. 0 DETAILED ANALYSIS 123,000 millilitres was carry through either earlier than 11. 00 Tuesday 11th or ater than 1900 Wednesday 12th rather than during this period, the flood level at the Brisbane City Gauge would not have exceeded the Major flood level, or if 335,000 millilitres was discharged outside the period 0200 Tuesday tenth to 0800 Thursday 13th rather then during the period, the flood level at the Brisbane City Gauge would not have exceeded the Moderate flood level, or if 623,000 mill ilitres was discharged outside of the period 1300 Monday 10th to 2100 Thursday 13th rather than during the period, there would not have been a flood at the Brisbane City Gauge. OBrien, 20119) APPENDIX 7 AND 8 free-and-easy RAINFALL GRAPH AND CHART 7. 0 REFEERNCE LIST Apelt, Mar 2011, say Flood Taskforce Report March 2011, viewed 19 April 2012, Himsley, May 2011, Dams and Flood Mitigation, viewed 19 April 2012, Honert, R & McAneney J 2011, The 2011 Brisbane Floods Causes, Impacts and Implications, Water Journal, Vol. , Iss. 4, pp 1149 1173, viewed 19 April 2012, http//www. mdpi. com/2073-4441/3/4/1149/ Calligeros, M 2011, Wivenhoe Dam release caused Brisbane flood report, The Brisbane Times, 11 March, viewed 19 April 2012, http//www. brisbanetimes. com. au/ surroundings/weather/wivenhoe-dam-release-caused-brisbane-flood-report-20110311-1bqk7. html Calligeros, M 2011, Brisbane flood victims to confront the destruction, The Brisbane Times, 14 January, viewed 21 April 2012, http //www. risbanetimes. com. au/environment/weather/brisbane-flood-victims-to-confront-the-destruction-20110113-19q04. html Seqwater, 2011, The January 2011 Flood Event, viewed 19 April 2012, Bureau of Meteorology, Feb 2011, Brisbane Metro in January 2011 A major rain event and severe flooding, viewed 21 April 2012, OBrien, Mar 2011, Brisbane Flooding January 2011 An Avoidable Disaster, viewed 19 April 2012, Bureau of Meteorology, Jan 2011, Monthly survive Review Queensland January 2011, viewed 21 April 2012, PM With Mark Colvin, ABC, 8 February 2011, ABC Australia, Brisbane. (Also a radio broadcast of it on http//www. abc. net. au/pm/content/2011/s3133417. htm)